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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.
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09/236,939 01/25/99 GODOWSKI

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EXAMINER

ULM, J

ART UNIT

PAPER NUMBER

1646

DATE MAILED:

09/13/01

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/236,939

Applicant(s)

Baker et al.

Examiner

First Last

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1234

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136 (a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on Jun 27, 2001
- 2a) ☒ This action is FINAL. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11; 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 31-44 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above, claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 31-44 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claims _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are objected to by the Examiner.
- 11) ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on _____ is: a) ☐ approved b) ☐ disapproved.
- 12) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 13) ☐ Acknowledgement is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some* c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

*See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

- 14) ☐ Acknowledgement is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e).

Attachment(s)

- 15) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 16) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 17) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s). _____
- 18) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). _____
- 19) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 20) ☐ Other:

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1) Claims 31 to 44 are pending in the instant application. Claims 31, 34, 36, 39 and 41 to 44 have been amended as requested by Applicant in Paper Number 14, filed 27 June of 2001.

2) Any objection or rejection of record which is not expressly repeated in this action has been overcome by Applicant's response and withdrawn.

3) The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

4) Claims 31 to 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they are drawn to an invention with no apparent or disclosed specific and substantial credible utility for those reasons of record in section 5 of Paper Number 11.

Applicant has traversed this rejection on the premise that HPTK6 has been shown to have patentable utility as evidenced by issuance of U.S. Patent No. 6,087,144. Applicant's reference to Patent Number 6,087,144 as establishing a patentable utility for the claimed nucleic acid is not persuasive because each application is examined on its own merits. In the decision of *In re Hutchison*, 69 USPQ 138 (CCPA, 1946), the court held that

"We are not concerned, of course, with the allowed claims in either the patent or in this application. The sole question for our determination is whether the six article claims on appeal were properly rejected below, and this we pass upon without further reference to, and without comparing them with, the claims in the patent or the claims which stand allowed in this application."

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In essence, the position in the instant application that each application is examined on its own merits can be found in the judicial precedent cited above. The rejections in the instant application will only be withdrawn if they are shown to be legally or factually unsound.

Applicant urges that HPTK6 is useful in the treatment of diseases by stimulating cell growth and differentiation. There is absolutely no evidence of record or sound scientific reasoning to support a conclusion that the administration of a nucleic acid of the instant invention, or the protein encoded thereby, to any individual will have a positive effect on the outcome of any of the diseases or disorders listed in the instant specification. Further, there is not a single reference of record describing the administration of any receptor tyrosine kinase or a nucleic acid encoding a receptor tyrosine kinase to an individual to treat a disease. A patent is granted for a completed invention, not the general suggestion of an idea and how that idea might be developed into the claimed invention. In the decision of *Genentec, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk*, 42 USPQ 2d 100,(CAFC 1997), the court held that:

“[p]atent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable” and that “[t]ossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure”. The court further stated that “when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process is to be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirements that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art”, “[i]t is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement”.

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The instant specification is not enabling because one can not follow the guidance presented therein and employ the claimed nucleic acid in the manner disclosed without first making a substantial inventive contribution if, in fact, the claimed nucleic acid can be employed to treat any disease or disorder at all.

Applicant has traversed this rejection on the premise that the claimed polynucleotide, a protein encoded by the claimed polynucleotide or an antibody thereto can be employed as a tissue marker and the employment of that protein as a tissue marker is a credible, specific and substantial utility. The employment of a protein of the instant invention, or a nucleic acid encoding that protein, as a tissue specific marker is not a substantial or specific utility. All human proteins can invariably be classified into two categories, those which are expressed in a tissue or developmentally specific manner and those which are expressed ubiquitously. It can be alleged that any protein which is expressed in a tissue specific manner can be employed to detect the tissue in which it is expressed in a sample. Alternately, a human protein which is expressed ubiquitously can be employed to detect the presence of any human tissue in a sample. Such utilities are analogous to the assertion that a particular protein can be employed as a molecular weight marker, which is neither a specific or substantial utility.

One could just as readily argue that any purified compound having a known structure could be employed as an analytical standard in such processes as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), infrared spectroscopy (IR), and mass spectroscopy as well as in polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE), high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) and gas

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chromatography. None of these processes could be practiced without either calibration standards having known molecular structures or, at least, a range of molecular weight markers having known molecular weights. It was just such applications that the court appeared to be referring to when it expressed the opinion that all chemical compounds are "useful" to the chemical arts when this term is given its broadest interpretation (*Brenner v. Manson*, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (Sus. Ct, 1966)). Because the steroid compound which was the subject of that decision had a known structure and molecular weight it could have readily been employed as a molecular standard at that time. Further, because that compound was a hydrocarbon it certainly could have been employed in the well known process of combustion for purposes of lighting and/ or the generation of heat. The generation of heat by combustion of hydrocarbons certainly was and remains an important process. Irrespective of such obvious utilities, the court still held that the compound produced by the process at issue in *Brenner v. Manson* did not have a specific and substantial utility.

To grant Applicant a patent encompassing an isolated polynucleotide encoding a naturally occurring human protein of as yet undetermined biological significance would be to grant Applicant a monopoly "the metes and bounds" of which "are not capable of precise delineation". That monopoly "may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area" and "confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public" (*Brenner v. Manson, Ibid*). To grant Applicant a patent on the claimed polynucleotide based solely upon an assertion that the protein encoded thereby can be employed as a tissue marker is

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clearly prohibited by this judicial precedent since the compensation to the public is not commensurate with the monopoly granted and would be no different than granting a patent on the process disputed in *Brenner v. Manson* on the premise that the steroid produced thereby was useful as an analytical standard or as a fuel source.

Applicant has cited several references which show that the aberrant expression of specific receptor tyrosine kinases having structural features in common with a protein of the instant invention have been shown to be associated with certain cancers. There is no doubt that certain receptor tyrosine kinase genes are causally associated with certain types of cancers. However, there is no evidence that the receptor tyrosine kinase of the instant invention is associated in any way with any particular type of cancer or with cancers in general.

Applicant's argument that a protein of the instant invention can be employed to produce antibodies thereto which then can be employed to detect that protein is a circular argument that is without merit.

5) Claims 31 to 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to adequately teach how to use the instant invention for those reasons given above with regard to the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

6) Claims 31 to 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) as being clearly anticipated by the Johnson et al. publication (P.N.A.S. 90:5677-5681, Jun. 1993).

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7) Claims 31 to 33, 35 to 38 and 40 to 44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) as being clearly anticipated by the Di Mardo et al. publication (J. Biol. Chem. 268:24290-24295, 15 Nov. 1993).

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless --

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.

8) Claims 41 to 44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by the Klein et al. publication (EMBO J. 8(12):3701-3709, 1989). Because any oligonucleotide will bind to any nucleic acid under the appropriate conditions, these claim encompass any oligonucleotide. When nucleic acid hybridization reactions are performed, denaturing factors such as heat and formamide are employed to minimize the non-specific binding of nucleic acid molecules to one another. By controlling these factors a practitioner of the art can control the degree of sequence similarity that is needed between the nucleotide sequences of two different nucleic acid molecules before they will form a heteroduplex (hybridize to one another). Since all nucleic acid molecules will bind ("hybridize") to one another under certain conditions the oligonucleotide which was employed in Figure 1 of Klein et al. would certainly bind to the nucleic acid molecule of any of claims 41 to 44 under the appropriate conditions.

9) Applicant's arguments filed 27 June of 2001 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive for those reasons given above.

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10) Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to John D. Ulm whose telephone number is (703) 308-4008. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday from 9:00 AM to 5:30 PM.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Yvonne Eyler can be reached at (703) 308-6564.

Official papers filed by fax should be directed to (703) 308-4242 or (703) 872-9306. Official responses under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 should be directed to (703) 872-9307.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application should be directed to the Group receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.

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